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Conceptual art and language: introducing a logico-semantic analysis
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This article suggests a logico-semantic analysis of Keith Arnatt’s Trouser-Word Piece
and Victor Burgin’s Room, based on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s examination of the logical
relationship between propositions and the world and M.A.K. Halliday’s discussion of
social semiotics. It reconsiders the use of language in conceptual art practices from a
wider sociological and interdisciplinary perspective, and aims to show how their
juxtaposition of different voices within a public context negotiates the space of art as a
social space. Focusing on how artworks communicate in context, the following
discussion presents the historical as well as the discursive environment in which
Arnatt’s and Burgin’s works are situated and received; moreover, it examines how
these works critically manipulate viewing and reading regimes, frameworks of
evaluation and patterns of communication in order to create a situation of particular
tension between perceptual and conceptual apprehension. In wider terms, this article
demonstrates how critically engaged artworks manipulate the conditions of commun-
ication by utilizing loan rhetoric (a rhetoric external to the art context) and displace
associate meaning in order to challenge the institutionalization of art’s production and
function. In doing so, they critically stage and contest the power structures that
support corresponding hierarchies across producer, audience and mediator, and bring
art’s social modality into focus. Investigating the manipulation of language in
conceptual art, this article proposes a method of analysis that becomes fundamental
in studying contemporary multi-modal art production, and in understanding the
dialectics of art’s communication and critical potential.
Keywords: conceptual art; logico-semantics; word and image; Keith Arnatt; Victor
Burgin; social semiotics
One cannot guess how a word functions.
One has to look at its use and learn from that.
But the difficulty is to remove the prejudice
which stands in the way of doing this.
It is not a stupid prejudice.
(Wittgenstein 1953, §340; original emphasis)
Introduction
The use of language in conceptual art is often explained as an attempt to replace the art-
object and to suppress the esthetic experience of art. Arguing that this attempt failed on
both accounts, this consideration is often accompanied by an evaluative distinction































(something that falls well within the modernist enquiry into art’s form and structure) from
advancing language as an arguably self-sufficient art form (Buchloh 1990; de Duve 1994;
Krauss 1973). Approaching a variety of artistic practices from this binary viewpoint
presents two main shortfalls.
First, it rigidifies a particular language for discussing conceptual art. True, the
conceptualization of an anti-esthetic impulse in conceptual art helps underline its
particular historical context, where modernist art discourse was institutionally advanced
as the dominant and best-articulated theory of art, and defended the immediacy and
autonomy of esthetic experience as a countermeasure to other forms of socially and
politically engaged artistic practice. However, while the history of modernism(s) itself has
been reconsidered from socio-political perspectives, and contemporary art’s social
practices call for diverse interpretations of art’s public presence and function, studies of
conceptual art often follow a narrow path of analysis. This conflates the critique of the
traditional art-object and its institutions (coined under the general rubric of “demateri-
alization”) with a particular interest in language as the prioritization of a strong
“conceptual” component. For contemporary art practices, a strong “conceptual”
component that has been elevated to an equally autonomous (self-referential or
tautological) status forms conceptual art’s legacy and becomes a means to establish their
relation to discourse as a form of legitimation (Osborne et al. 1997; Osborne 2010).
Second, an ontological distinction between artistic and non-artistic means becomes
unattainable in light of a multifaceted contemporary art production in global visual art
markets, while (art) writing has been institutionally established as a critical practice.
Approaching conceptual art’s use of language along this line of enquiry often involves a
“linguistic turn,” which can be understood as referring to the choice of visual artists to
utilize language as well as to the production of increasingly critical texts by artists, which
were disseminated in exhibition catalogues and avant-garde art magazines. Indeed,
throughout the seventies, the page became a new site for production and experience of
art, claiming a space traditionally reserved for art criticism where the binary critical text/
photographic reproduction also played out a division of professional labor. Nevertheless,
one should keep in mind how attention to language use was not an exclusively artistic
phenomenon. From the fifties onwards, the status of language and its relation to moral
truth and an infallible state of consciousness was philosophically challenged, and new
developments in linguistics, communication studies, and cultural theory contested the
one-to-one model of dialogical exchange and marked the power of discourse in language,
the organization of knowledge, and social life. Particular to the British context, the work
of Ludwig Wittgenstein and logical positivism (Ayer, Carnap) shaped critical thinking,
along with influences from the French intellectual scene (especially Barthes and
Foucault). In the sixties and seventies, critical linguistics developed at the University of
East Anglia and the Birmingham Schools of Discourse Analysis and Culture Studies
advanced scholarship with influences from M.A.K. Halliday, Basil Bernstein’s ([1971]
1973) sociolinguistics, French structuralism, and Marxist theory (Threadgold 2003). By
the time conceptual art practices emerged, it became a central premise across the
humanities and the social sciences that meaning is created through social processes that
are subject to discursive and ideological regimes. Extending this fundamental thesis to the
artworld, the refutation of any natural or universal meaning in linguistic or pictorial signs,




























intuitive experience but also the privileged status of the artist-genius and artistic
production.
The lack of discussions on conceptual art and its use of language from a wider
sociological and interdisciplinary perspective is evident in the case of canonical (Western)
practices as opposed to more adaptable considerations of Latin American or East
European activities. Inviting a diverse reading of conceptual art beyond evaluations of a
particular type of modernist esthetic, this article aims to show how the critical use of
language within a public context negotiates the space of art as a social space. It proposes
a logico-semantic analysis of two seminal British conceptual artworks, Keith Arnatt’s
Trouser-Word Piece (1972) and Victor Burgin’s Room (1970), based on Wittgenstein’s
examination of the logical relationship between propositions and the world and Halliday’s
discussion of social semiotics. These artworks, the one combining a text with a
photograph and the other exclusively utilizing linguistic propositions, create a situation
of particular tension between perceptual and conceptual apprehension. As this article
argues, they manipulate the conditions of communication by utilizing loan rhetoric (a
rhetoric external to the art context) and displace associate meaning in order to challenge
the institutional status of the artist. In doing so, they critically stage and contest the power
structures that establish reading and viewing regimes and, most importantly, they bring
art’s social modality into focus.
A logico-semantic analysis considers the relations between signs within linguistic
structures at a functional level, and the relations between signs and extra-linguistic
objects or relations at the level of social discourse. Rather than investing in some esthetic
or anti-esthetic impulse in art, and accepting that artworks have conceptual as much as
perceptual significance as long as they have material presence, this article examines the
manipulation of language in conceptual art as a paradigmatic starting point in the analysis
of the dialectics of art’s communication and critical potential. On the one hand, because
the attention to context and the implications for meaning was an interest contemporary to
conceptual art, an analysis of how the latter communicates in context contributes to the
art historical enquiry and helps overcome those binaries that are typically associated with
conceptual art (esthetic/anti-esthetic, art/language, artistic sensitivity/pure logic). On the
other hand, the emphasis on meaning-making as a social practice allows one to consider
art’s variable roles across the social field of semiosis (as an art-object, a placeholder for
bourgeois values, a social formulation etc.) and becomes fundamental in studying
contemporary multi-modal art production. A logico-semantic analysis, therefore, has a
wider application, offering a methodology or a basis for a theory of visual communication
that explains how artistic practices engage with their audiences and raise concerns beyond
the artworld.
This is not to say that the use of language makes an artwork ipso facto critical. Rather,
the critical currency of a medium or method (the use of found objects, linguistic
propositions, public spaces) fluctuates across different historical contexts and institutional
settings. For this reason, the work’s criticality cannot be deduced to a matter of simply
enlisting non-painterly or sculptural means (with reference to conceptual art; non-visual,
haptic, affective etc. with reference to contemporary art) in order to make a statement.
Rather, it involves a process that dialectically interrelates the object, the viewer, and their
communication, and therefore depends on whether the artwork succeeds in securing,
albeit provisionally, a procedural method of production that cannot be readily assimilated





























The opening statements of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, published in 1921, read: “The world
is all that is the case” (1) and “The world is the totality of facts, not things” (1.1)
(Wittgenstein 2002). Rejecting any vantage point outside language, Wittgenstein sought
to interpret the nature of propositions and their relation to the world. For Wittgenstein, to
find the general form of proposition also meant to show the limits of language since what
could not be generated by this general proposition would be nonsensical and outside the
realm of language. As Wittgenstein noted, “The limit will therefore only be capable of
being drawn in language, and what lies outside of the limits will be simply nonsense”
(2002, 3). Or, as famously written in Tractatus: “the limits of language […] mean the
limits of my world” (Wittgenstein 2002, 5.6.2, original emphasis).
The attention to facts, not things, underlines the importance placed on existence in a
state of affairs rather than on existence in general. Acknowledging the particularity of the
case at hand, the focal point of investigation becomes how things are arranged in
language and in the world, and how these two systems correlate. Wittgenstein analyzed
language as a system of significant (Sinvol) propositions that yield a schematic
representation (Bild) of the relation between words and facts: “A proposition is a picture
of reality: for if I understand a proposition I know the situation that it represents” (2002,
4.021).1 This means that things exist in a state of affairs and convey those logical
structures and rules that make them communicable independently of whether they are true
or false. Moreover, sense must be determinate (or pre-agreed, bestimmt) (Wittgenstein
2002, 3.23). This emphasizes that the evaluation of a proposition as true or false requires
that it is answerable to something – for Wittgenstein, this is the world. On the contrary, a
proposition for which one can decide whether it is true or false without having to measure
it against the world is a tautology, i.e. unconditionally true – for example, “We will leave
when we leave.”
In the sixties and seventies, developments in linguistics (notably conversational
analysis and discourse analysis) and in cultural studies (notably critical discourse
analysis) examined language as an instrument of communication and focused on its
social and political dimensions, social exchange, and the reproduction of ideology and
power.2 Accordingly, discourse is a communicative event where conversational
participants are doing something else beyond just using language: they interact. Equally,
meaning is determined through processes of social interaction. It is important, therefore,
to understand language as a social semiotic – a system of information that must be
interpreted with reference to its place in the social process of communication, the
conventions and assumptions made in this process, and the type and aim of the situation
within which it operates (Halliday 1978). Halliday characteristically asks: “How else can
one look at language except in a social context?” (1978, 10; original emphasis). Likewise,
in a communicational exchange, the text (verbal, visual, textual) is not only an instance of
linguistic interaction, but a process of sharing – the shared creation of meaning (Halliday
1994, 175). Most importantly, since language is actualized within given social situations
where it communicates information about these situations, the patterns of behavior, and
habitual thought, it also serves as a vehicle of reality. In that sense, Halliday (2002b)




























Keith Arnatt’s Trouser-Word Piece (1972)
Conceptual artworks advanced strategies of re-signification and transposition of signs and
meanings across artistic and non-artistic sites, aiming to create an aporia of meaning that
implicated the status of the object as well as the validity of the viewing and reading
modes that help to shape and recognize that object. In the analysis of visual culture, the
juxtaposition of images and texts has particular importance, because it brings together not
only different modes of communication but also their respective systems of interpretation
and evaluation. The photographic part of Arnatt’s Trouser-Work Piece was widely
circulated on the occasion of the exhibition The New Art (17 August–24 September 1972,
the Hayward Gallery) as the arrogant face of this new art and the authoritarian yet
arbitrary claims of its artists (Figure 1).
The New Art was organized by Anne Seymour, Assistant Keeper of the Tate, for the
Arts Council of Great Britain and was envisaged as the first in a series of biennials
mapping contemporary art production. Contrary to initial planning, the show focused on
selected artists working in mixed media, while a stand with relevant exhibition
catalogues, artists’ books, and other publications was available during the show (TNA
archives). For its part, the exhibition catalogue featured a dedicated artists’ section –
something that was a novelty by the standards of British public galleries but that became
characteristic of conceptual art exhibition catalogues by the early 1970s. Paradigmatic of
its contemporary interest in philosophy and language, The New Art catalogue included
Burgin’s analysis of art’s institutional framework with reference to Wittgenstein and
French structuralism; Art & Language’s reflections on Index 02 (1972) with reference to
Figure 1. “Keith Arnatt winning friends and influencing people at the Hayward’s ‘The New Art’”




























Morris Weitz; and John Stezaker’s analysis of the relation between art and theory from a
traditional and analytical perspective. Arnatt’s participation included Trouser-Word Piece
and excerpts from Art and Egocentricity – A Perlocutionary Act? (1971), which
discussed Grice and Searle.
According to the exhibition’s press release, The New Art sought to challenge the time-
honored notion of art being primarily concerned with beauty and, as the organizer argued,
aimed to capture the latest developments in artistic production in Britain, which were
more gradual in comparison to other European or American countries (TNA archives;
Syemour 1972, 5). This particularity can be explained by the mediatory position of the
British art scene between an internationally projected American modernism and distinct
European avant-garde movements, and by the changes in national art education and
public funding for the arts (Morris 2005; Richards 2003, 462–465; Harrison and Orton
1982; Harrison 1971; Warren Piper 1971). By the mid-sixties, the element of the “new”
advanced by the Independent Group became part of Britain’s answer to the influence of
abstract expressionism (Massey 1995). In 1968, the Arts Council opened the Hayward
Gallery as its dedicated exhibition space, thus ending its collaboration with the Tate, and
supported the expansion of the Institute of Contemporary Arts. The activities of the ICA
become particularly important. Its opening show, The Obsessive Image 1960–1968,
presented an assembly of new art production across the media, television, and
advertisement. In 1969, ICA presented an assembly of the seminal touring conceptual
art exhibition When Attitudes become Form: Works-Concepts-Situations-Information (28
September–7 October 1969), sponsored by Philip Morris Europe.
For its part, the Hayward’s The New Art attracted over 13,000 visitors, a total income
above £4000, and various shades of public disapproval. For many, the artworks on
display were neither “art” nor “new”; others questioned the fairness of the selection
process and the Arts Council’s policy, and argued that the exhibits, being neither
paintings nor sculptures, did not belong in a public gallery, let alone on tax-payers’
money (TNA archives). Equally, press reviews claimed that the show’s contents were
absurd, verbally unintelligible, concerned with linguistics and structuralism rather than
with color theories or social evils, and more likely to be informed by Wittgenstein and




























Levi-Strauss rather than by Monet and Manet (Mullaly 1972; “London Art Scene” 1972;
Gosling 1972).
Arnatt’s Trouser-Word Piece combines a text and a photograph in individually frames
of the same size (1005 × 1005 mm) (Figure 2). The text, an excerpt from John Austin’s
Sense and Sensibilia (1962), discusses how understanding the word “real” entails a
process of exclusion that is particular to the specific application of the word “real.” In the
photograph, a black and white body portrait, the artist holds a sandwich board that reads
“I’m a real artist.” The examination of the logico-semantics of this work begins with an
analysis of the latter proposition, and then considers the work’s behavior in context. The
central premise in this analysis is that things already exist in a state of affairs that is
shaped by conventions and appropriate rules of engagement. This concerns both
observation and description. By extension, things are always set in a state of affairs,
and talking about them sets them in a state of affairs thus understood. As Wittgenstein
emphasized “only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning” (2002, 3.3).
In the case of Arnatt’s Trouser-Word Piece, this nexus is institutional.
In the photographic part of the work, we read “I’m a real artist.” In the process of
communication, the necessary and sufficient conditions of understanding an utterance are
knowledge of grammar and vocabulary – that is, knowledge of how the constituent parts
of a sentence interrelate and how they relate to the world. Before commencing the
analysis of the proposition “I’m a real artist,” let us avoid, momentarily, marked words
such as “real” and “artist” and their associated traditions of privileged artistic subjectivity
and genius, and consider the structure “X is Y” in a more simple form such as “Sam is a
brother.” This utterance could be used to mean that “Sam has two parents who have at
least one child other than Sam and Sam is related to that child as being his or her
brother.” Notwithstanding, real language users avoid utilizing simple, elementary
propositions, because that would impede communication, if not making it impossible.
Rather, they rely upon the reassurance that there are certain underlying and shared
conditions that make a particular meaning possible and they behave so accordingly,
expecting that their utterances will be judged as true or false on those conditions. Thus, if
one contested the validity of the above proposition by replying that “no, Sam is not a
brother”, one could either mean that a) “no, Sam’s parents do not have any other
offspring” or b) “no, Sam’s parents do have children, but they are all female.” On the
other hand, if the speaker by saying “Sam is a brother” intended to actually say that “Sam
is a brother from the ‘hood’” and one tried to verify the truth of the proposition by
investigating Sam’s family condition, then interpretation has missed the point. In other
words, the conditions of meaning not only depend on situation and context, but also on
the form of the proposition (mode, tenor) and the intention of the speaker (Halliday
1978). Finally, this process of analysis also makes clear the methodological distinction
between understanding the conditions of communication within a language system from
evaluating whether a proposition is plausible or convincing. This becomes particularly
important in the discussions of artworks, where the esthetic often functions as both a
mode of communication and evaluation.
Returning to Arnatt’s proposition “I’m a real artist”, it can be analyzed into two
simpler ones, the first proposing the relation of the object to the world and the second
qualifying that relation. Thus, we have the conjunction:




























The first proposition, “I am an artist”, can bet logically represented as follows:
ðExÞIx &ð8xÞð8yÞðIx&Iy ! x ¼ yÞ & ð8xÞðIx ! AxÞ
This reads that there is an “I” that is only one (thus everything else that is qualified as “I”
is identical to itself) and for every x instance of that “I” that “I” is “an artist.”3 Here, the
necessary conditions that allow one to decide whether this statement is true or false are
that an “I” must exist, and that “artist” must be such a characteristic that can be attributed
to that “I.” Had this compact statement been presented in a more elementary form, for
example “I, Keith Arnatt, the real person whose work is exhibited in an art gallery where
artists exhibit their works can be classified as the commonly understood artist – that is, a
person who exhibits his works in an art gallery,” analysis would have become redundant.
Extending the study of linguistic structures to their semantic environment, Arnatt’s
proposition is presented within an art context by a photograph. This context becomes the
measure of the proposition “I am an artist” where the latter communicates based on
certain conditions. In this case, these are, I suggest, relevance and symmetry. The
condition of relevance is observed when one relates the immediately viewed object to a
subject known from contextual vicinity, which can be spatio-temporal or referential. For
example, one would relate a numbered tag on a pair of boots found in a shoe shop to the
equivalent price of that pair. In the case of Arnatt’s proposition, one understands the “I” to
relate to a person called “Keith Arnatt”, either because one recognizes him in the picture or
because one recognizes him as the author of the work (for example, as indicated by the
caption to the image that refers to the person, Keith Arnatt). Symmetry, or symmetrical
transposition, underlines a state of affairs and, as a condition of communication, allows one
to draw parallels between the quality of a context and its contents. While the artworld is a
particularly mutable environment characterized by shifting financial and ideological
interests, the following logical association is nevertheless generally valid: “if this art gallery
is a place where artists show their work and Keith Arnatt participates in the show then he is
an artist.” Combining the conditions of recognition and symmetry, analysis shows why it
becomes reasonable to assume that the proposition “I am an artist” can refer to the artist of
the work, Keith Arnatt, who participates in an art exhibition such as The New Art.
The conjunction of the second propositional component in the photographic part of
Arnatt’s work, “real”, can be understood as a qualifier of the relation of the proposition “I
am an artist” to the world, as suggested above. Generally speaking, the word “real”
entails comparison and knowledge of the relevant state of at least two things. When one
says “object A is real and object B is not”, it means that one is in a position to argue
about the state of both object A and B. Here, the famous example from Austin involves a
rubber duck (see Figure 3), but the word “real” can also be used as an evaluative, for
example, “this is a real steak.” More specifically to our case, if the word “real” qualifies
the relation of the proposition “I am an artist” to the world, it must yield a logico-
semantic rule for at least one of the conditions of communication of the latter as
explained above, which propose its relation to the world. In the case of relevance, the
“real” qualifies “Keith Arnatt” (to whom the “I” of the first clause refers) as a real person.
In the case of symmetry, the “real” qualifies the word “artist”, which derives from the
logical association that “this is a commonly understood artist because artists exhibit their
works in an art gallery and the works exhibited in an art gallery are done by artists.”




























“real” relevance of art on behalf of the viewer and “real” symmetrical transposition of
quality on behalf of the art establishment. Finally, recalling from Wittgenstein (2002,
4.0312) that logical constants such as “and” and “or” are not representatives, both
conditions become answerable to the world. Thus, in the process of communication,
Trouser-Word Piece brings into focus how “gallery” becomes the site of qualification of
art and “exhibit” the mode.
The second stage of analysis examines the juxtaposition of the work’s textual and
photographic parts. The photograph of the artist holding a panel with the proposition “I’m
a real artist” is presented next to a frame of same size with an excerpt from Austin. This
composition seems to work better in comparison to other formats of presentation such as
placing both image and text on the same page, which was considered by the artist (Arnatt
1972), or placing each one on each side of a postcard, which became available at the time
(KA archives). Specifically, the selected correlation of image and text challenges the
status of the photograph as a neutral or self-evident medium, and is instrumental in the
process of hierarchization of meaning. Visually, the work seems to generate a series of
interrelated frames. The framed image of the artist, whose subject matter is yet another
frame (that of the sandwich board), is located next to a framed text, whose layout is
typical for signs or, given the context of art exhibitions, explanatory notes that usually
accompany works of art proper. Understanding the frame also defines understanding its
content, which is artificially (i.e. visually, materially) separated from its surroundings but
which remains conceptually relevant (i.e. artists working within the framework of a
gallery system of evaluation and distribution of art).
Finally, turning to the image’s accompanying text, the artist chose the following
extract as shown in Figure 3.
Austin’s discussion of the word “real” is an additional correlation point between the
text and the framed picture next to it of an artist holding a sign that reads “I’m a real
Keith Arnatt 
TROUSER – WORD PIECE 
‘It is usually thought, and I dare say usually rightly thought, that what one might call 
the affirmative use of a term is basic – that, to understand ‘x’, we need to know what 
it is to be x, or to be an x, and that knowing this apprises us of what it is not to be x, 
not to be an x. But with ‘real’ . . . . it is the negative use that wears the trousers. That 
is, a definite sense attaches to the assertion that something is real, a real such-and-
such, only in the light of a specific way in which it might be, or might have been, not 
real. ‘A real duck’ differs from the simple ‘a duck’ only in that it is used to exclude 
various ways on being not a real duck - but a dummy, a toy, a picture, a decoy, &c.; 
and moreover I don’t know just how to take the assertion that it’s a real duck unless 
I know just what, on that particular occasion, the speaker had it in mind to exclude. . 
. . (The) function of ‘real’ in not to contribute positively to the characterisation of 
anything, but to exclude possible ways of being not real - and these ways are both 
numerous for particular kinds of things, and liable to be quite different for things of 
different kinds. It is this identity of general function combined with immense 
diversity in specific applications which gives to the word ‘real’ the, at first sight, 
baffling feature of having neither one single ‘meaning,’ nor yet ambiguity, a number 
of different meanings.’ 
John Austin, ‘Sense and Sensibilia.’ 





























artist.” Specifically, Austin examines the problem of identification through reference and
argues that the notion of the “real” communicates on the conditions that, first, one must
know by contrast that which is not “real,” and second, one must know what the speaker
intends to say by the specific application of the word “real.” A central premise of
discourse analysis regarding the meaning-making process as demonstrated by the example
“Sam is a brother” is that in order to understand what the speaker is talking about one must
know, or at least have some knowledge of, what the speaker talks about. In his analysis,
and illustrating his point regarding the use of the word “real,” Austin uses the following
metaphor: that it is the negative use of the word that wears the trousers –in other words,
that the non-real has the lead in the process of recognition and identification. This
metaphor draws on from the text’s social context where the expression “wears the
trousers” resides, and in turn creates a parallel between the reading of the text and social
behavior. Projected beyond its frame on the gallery wall or on the printed page, the text
operates within a social context where hierarchical relations are structured in a certain way
that is neither neutral nor natural but maintained by shared believes, convention, and force.
As this analysis aimed to demonstrate, Trouser-Word Piece exists in a dynamic state
of communication that is externally sustained and whose rules of engagement and
conventions are critically mirrored and challenged by the work. Thus, how are the words
“real” and “artist”, and the image of someone wearing trousers and holding a sandwich
board to be understood in this artwork, which exists within the artworld as well as within
a wider social context? The work duplicates Austin’s use of a common metaphor in
textual and visual terms. However, this process does not simply entail the transfer of a
quality of something into a parallel environment, but also contextualizes that quality and
shows how it is culturally determined. Put differently, the work does not only compare
things (a man, a photograph, a rubber duck). Rather, and more critically, it draws parallels
across the act of recognizing objects and their contextual status: recognizing someone as a
man, because he is wearing trousers, a street vendor, because his is wearing a sign, and an
artist, because he exhibits his works in an art gallery. At this point, one may argue that
understanding what the artist is saying does not mean that one has to believe him or
accept him as an artist (or his work as art). However, who has to believe it to be true in
order for Arnatt to be a real artist? And if he is an artist, does this make this work, the
means to convince that its author is a real artist, art? Then again, if one accepts that
language embodies social norms, one should also accept that wearing a sandwich board
as if he were a street vendor commercializes the artist, since he does, after all, self-
promote and sell his art.
Trouser-Word Piece successfully shifts reading and viewing attention not only across
the object in question and the subject of its making, but also across the subject of its
viewing and the conditions of producing and displaying art. The work can be understood
within a hierarchical system of classification and promotion of art, for example a gallery
space where visitors recognize and symmetrically transpose institutionalized power
structures. Through the work’s critical engagement with its own condition as an art
exhibit, “real” becomes a relevant notion polarized between those who potentially make a
real selection of art (the art dealer? the public? funding bodies for the arts?) and those
who contest this process, as Keith Arnatt may be doing or as the viewer is encouraged to
do. By extension, the work prompts one to question how it could be for an artist not to
exhibit his or her work in an art gallery and how it could be for the gallery-goer not to be




























well as reading and viewing regimes, Arnatt’s work exceeds its material and institutional
frame and comes into dialogue with the social space that surrounds it. Or better, it
dialogically engages the gallery space as a social space. No doubt, when the photographic
part of Trouser-Word Piece is isolated and circulated as the arrogant face of a new type of
artist – the conceptual artist – the work’s self-critical engagement with its constituted
parts, the co-text, and the reader/viewer is suppressed and replaced by a celebratory
affirmation of both the art-object and the artist. For his part, and exceeding the
institutional and physical confinement of art in galleries, the artist took his iconic portrait
to the streets, appearing with the signboard reading “I’m a real artist” in public spaces and
outside art institutions (Live in Your Head 2000, 2).
Victor Burgin’s Room (1970)
Critically engaged conceptual art practices brought to the surface and interrogated those
qualities of art that were held self-evident and reproduced by institutional discourse and
market behavior. They involved reflections not only on form and spatial context, but also
on other social practices that were, overtly or covertly, interrelated with the processes of
production, promotion, and theorization of art. In this sense, conceptual art’s concerns did
not only engage art’s esthetic, but also its rhetoric. To better understand what art’s rhetoric
can mean and how it was formulated as a conceptualization of one of art’s multiple
aspects, one can analyze how conceptual art implicated the language used to talk about
art within general social formulations, as well as the artwork’s own voice – for example,
by considering a text-based work. Comparing textual artworks and artworks that
juxtapose image and text allows us to examine different patterns of communication, as
well as to check the methodological range of the analysis.
Victor Burgin’s Room consists of 18 numbered propositions and was originally shown
at Idea Structures (24 June–19 July 1970, Camden Arts Centre) (Figure 4). Organized by
Charles Harrison for the Borough of Camden, London as an annual survey of
developments in contemporary art, the exhibition took place at the Camden Arts Centre
and the local library at Swiss Cottage (a 15-minute walk away). Exhibits were presented
in conjunction with relevant catalogue entries and, in retrospect, the organizer notes how
he “naively envisaged [it] as a representation of the hard-line in conceptual art” (Harrison
2002, 223). Burgin’s work exclusively filled the center’s biggest room. Its propositions
were individually reproduced on 280 × 200 mm paper panels and pasted, as instructed, in
order and at equal intervals around an “otherwise empty, white painted room (starting to
the right of the entrance and finishing to the left)” (Conception 2001, 38). As Harrison
recalls, "You came into the gallery and it just looked as if there was nothing in there at
all" (2011, 30). Room was also shown at The New Art on a panel with other propositional
works by Burgin that explored the relations across signification, position, and experience
(see VB Archives; Burgin 1973). It was bought by the Tate in 1973, while the Arts
Council of Great Britain bought Performative-Narrative Piece (1971) in 1973 and This
Position (1969) in 1974. These and later works by Burgin negotiate the semiotic and
ideological functions of signs across viewing subjects and viewed objects, and contest the
ideological division between the inside and the outside of the gallery (Burgin 1986). In his
text “Margin Note”, included in The New Art exhibition catalogue, Burgin discusses the





























ALL SUBSTANTIAL THINGS WHICH CONSTITUTE THIS ROOM
2 
ALL THE DURATION OF 1 
3 
THE PRESENT MOMENT AND ONLY THE PRESENT MOMENT
4 
ALL APPEARANCES OF 1 DIRECTLY EXPERIENCED BY YOU AT 3 
5 
ALL OF YOUR RECOLLECTION AT 3 OF APPEARANCES OF 1 DIRECTLY EXPERIENCED BY 
YOU AT ANY MOMENT PREVIOUS TO 3 
6 
ALL CRITERIA BY WHICH YOU MIGHT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 5 AND 
MEMBERS OF 4 
7 
ALL OF YOUR RECOLLECTION AT 3 OTHER THAN 5 
8 
ALL BODILY ACTS PERFORMED BY YOU AT 3 WHICH YOU KNOW TO BE DIRECTLY 
EXPERIENCED BY PERSONS OTHER THAN YOURSELF
9 
ALL BODILY ACTS DIRECTLY EXPERIENCED BY YOU AT 3 PERFORMED BY PERSONS OTHER 
THAN YOURSELF
10 
AL L MEMBERS OF 9 AND ALL MEMBERS OF 8 WHICH ARE DIRECTED TOWARDS MEMBERS 
OF 1 
11 
ALL OF YOUR BODILY ACTS AT 3 OTHER THAN 8 
12 
ALL OF YOUR BODILY SENSATIONS AT 3 WHICH YOU CONSIDER CONTINGENT UPON YOUR 
BODILY CONTACT WITH ANY MEMBER OF 1 
13 
ALL OF YOUR BODILY SENSATIONS AT 3 WHICH YOU CONSIDER CONTINGENT UPON ANY 
EMOTION DIRECTLY EXPERIENCED BY YOU 
14 
ALL CRITERIA BY WHICH YOU MIGHT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 13 AND 
MEMBERS OF 12 
15 
ALL OF YOUR BODILY SENSATIONS AT 3 OTHER THAN 13 AND 12 
16 
ALL OF YOUR INFERENCES FROM 9 CONCERNING THE INNER EXPERIENCES OF ANY PERSON 
OTHER THAN YOURSELF
17 
ANY MEMBER OF 16 WHICH YOU CONSIDER IN WHOLE OR IN PART ANALOGOUS WITH ANY 
MEMBER OF 13 
18 
ANY MEMBER OF 16 WHICH YOU CONSIDER IN WHOLE OR IN PART ANALOGOUS WITH ANY 
MEMBER OF 12 




























activity, and how language embodies social order, while social institutions impose their
own frameworks, which the work’s critical and political aim is to reveal (Burgin 1972a).
Burgin’s early propositional works such as Room have been interpreted as part of the
tradition of minimalist sculpture and the historical development of art, formulated by
Clement Greenberg, through problem-solving challenges. In the case of Room, these
challenges included object placement after Robert Morris and an inquiry for a non-
geometrical and non-organic form after Donald Judd, to which Burgin responded by
using the exhibition room as part of the work and removing the object all together
(Burgin 1982, 1997). Artworks often seek to underline the contingency of the physical
object by creating situations, drawing attention to space and movement, and prompting
the spectator to become aware of her own position. More critically, this interest can
expand to the social attitudes that encompass and establish these acts, and seek to uncover
the viewing and reading processes that situate art and the habits and ideological interests
of recognition. One way of doing this is by turning attention to how linguistic structures
set the conditions of apprehension on which esthetic systems are designed (Burgin 1969).
In the case of Room, a logico-semantic analysis will demonstrate how the work creates a
situation where the picture of reality, which it meticulously fabricates, is forcefully
measured against those perceptual and conceptual processes that structure reality beyond
the artwork. In doing so, Room reveals how not only the artwork as an object (and its
contents as referential signs) but also the relations that it stages and which are created
through its interaction with the viewer/reader exist in a state of affairs (Figure 4).
At a first level of analysis regarding the work’s visual, public display, the placement
of Room’s propositions on small strips of paper around the gallery walls is reminiscent of
captions to images that are now, as objects, strikingly absent. Thus, even if the work is
considered visually “dry”, it does not (and could not) operate on an exclusively linguistic,
referential level. Rather, by combining reference in seemingly factual propositions with
placement in an institutional space, the work manipulates both its visual allocation and
the viewer’s reading activity. At the level of content, Room interrelates co-text with
context in such a way that creates a series of transgressions of the logical and perceptual
order of things. The work operates on two fundamental propositions that indicate a total
space (proposition (1) “all substantial things which constitute this room”) and a total time
(proposition (3) “the present moment and only the present moment”). As reading unfolds,
consequent propositions demand attention to sensations, recollections, and inferences; to
the criteria according to which these can be spatio-temporally distinguished; and
reflection on the actions of one’s body and of others. Because of the numerical ordering
of these propositions and their instructive association, the process of reading the work
contributes to understanding and developing its structural unity. However, and despite the
factual tone of its propositions, the work’s unity is sustained by conceptual as much as
physical movements across an interpersonal, communal space.4 Staged by the proposi-
tions’ interrelated claims, this movement takes place within the gallery room that now
becomes the work’s both subject and object, a space of semiotic inscription of conceptual
and physical enclosure.
Room’s temporal and indexical propositions are structured in a progressive order that
both interrelates them and correlates them to the world. As reading progresses, the work
exceeds its spatio-temporal parameters and opens up to the world. Consider, for example,
proposition (5) “all of your recollection at 3 of appearances of 1 directly experienced by




























apprehension, it now requests recollections and inferences to be made beyond its own
structural parameters, drawing attention to other systems such as the architectural
composition of the gallery space, the artist’s intentions, the viewer’s own understanding,
social behavior, institutional conventions. In addition, these propositions are articulated in
a process of accumulation and exclusion that logically involves deduction of the
particular from the general. In linguistic terms, signs are combined according to principles
of combination and differentiation; in the case of art, this also involves processes of
evaluation and decision-making that Room brings to the surface. This is a second
transgression of the unity of the work. Even though it may appear as advancing an
autonomous, stable whole – an evaluation supported by the work’s exclusive allocation in
the gallery room, austere presence and serial propositional structure – its articulation
dialogically engages other systems. At the end, the opening statement (1) “All substantial
things which constitute this room” can only be understood in a nexus of meaning that is
conceptually, contextually, and institutionally structured.
Room prompts one to realize how even the most naturalized and factual situations or
objects can only be tentatively defined. For Burgin, the use of generic language facilitated
association across different contexts and display situations (galleries, catalogues, art
publications) (Burgin 1972b, 1974). The tendency to linguistic abstraction is well-located
within the historical context of conceptual art. Other strategies include the manipulation
of common signifying systems from the everyday within their ideological and political
contexts – consider, for example, Burgin’s UK 76 (1976) series. However, while the
printed multiple page was a typical mode of dissemination of conceptual art, and one that
technically did not alter the work’s textual nature in reproduction, there is a qualitative
difference between a public and a private reading of the work. This involves changes in
the connotations and correlations that characterize different contexts, the public
interaction of viewer and artwork, and the difference between bodily transposition in
the gallery room and the reading movement across the page. Most importantly, there is a
shift, as a final transgression, of the public sphere of affairs into a private one. While the
work’s presence beyond the gallery room can still implicate institutional hierarchies and
negotiate different perceptual configurations, the fact that the reader of the reproduction
can own the page further mystifies the artwork’s conditions of production and
consumption that are themselves reproduced in multiple copies as factual.
Conclusions
This article examines artworks within the broader cultural and social context, which is
historically shaped by social behaviors and institutional policies. While utterances may
appear as isolated instances, they are generated within discourse and operate under given
frames of reference through the interaction of notational, logical, and social systems. In
the case of conceptual art, this frame often relies on the polarity between art’s esthetic
value and language’s logical operations. Yet experiencing art is a social as much as a
discursive activity that must be considered within the ideological, economic, social, and
cultural milieu. As Halliday (2002a) explains for texts (and, we can add, images), these
are actualized within certain discourses where they exist not only by what is said but
perhaps most importantly by what is left unsaid. If conceptual art discredited any singular
attention on the object of art, it did so by bringing into focus the enabling conditions of




























rehearses. In their less critical version, conceptual art practices created localized
paradoxical instances while ignoring their own conditions and therefore remained limited
to them. In their more critical version, they engaged with, or indicated a way of engaging
with, the conditions (material, perceptual, institutional) that support things such as the art-
object by dialectically shifting attention to the discursive processes of apprehension and
evaluation of art.
As a method, the study of the logico-semantic relations of artworks with a visual
culture examines their material form, referential content, and variable engagement across
different environments. Particular to conceptual art and its use of language, artworks
critically manipulated the image/text binary, which reflects the traditional dichotomy
mind/body (Mitchell 1987) and arbitrary/universal, and demonstrated how both pictorial
and linguistic signs are subject to reiteration, appropriation, and validation as part of the
social semiotic. Combining the use of loan rhetoric with formal, visual strategies, works
such as Trouser-Word Piece and Room signal content within a broader cultural context
(Roberts 1986). This is not only done at the level of structure or esthetic apprehension,
but also at a level where the manipulation of semiotic and semantic codes deconstructs
the visual art rhetoric. Put differently, such artworks communicate through processes that
challenge percept and concept, the inside and outside of the work, and move across their
frame, gallery space, and public sphere. They do so by constructing a picture of reality to
which they are both the subject and the object, and which they seek to contest. Bearing
the danger of undermining the validity of their own status and artistic licence to do so,
they open up the experience and consideration of art to its social context.
Arnatt’s Trouser-Word Piece reveals the conditions of relevance and symmetry (or
recognition and agreement) that make it communicable and the mechanisms of conferring
and sustaining artistic value. In a historical context that strongly advocated esthetic
experience as a private, unmediated affair among the individual artist-genius, the art-
collector, and the bourgeois art-lover, the critical negotiation of the supporting value
system of art (by using language, for example) was easily deemed as a passing artistic
fancy.5 Even so, the work’s critique of the institutional setting of art remains valid as long
as such hierarchical administrative structures remain in place. In 2002, Trouser-Word
Piece was acquired by the Tate. Since then, it has been exhibited as part of a tradition that
promotes the cult of the artist-celebrity leading up to Tracy Emin (Self-Evident 2002);
affirming the artist’s real photographic interests (I’m a Real Photographer 2007); or
advancing him as a real sculptor (Box, Body, Burial 2009). In 2010, the artist Savage
developed the series I’m A Fraud (2010), which engaged with concepts of ownership and
rites of exchange, and appeared on the February cover of an magazine with a sandwich
board that read “I’m a fraud.” The self-reflective enquiry of Arnatt’s work causes it to
oscillate between absurdity and tautology. Responding to a particularly pertinent
discussion of its time, Trouser-Word Piece would not need to assert its universal, self-
evident nature if it really were art; if it needs to do so and be externally and institutionally
validated, then it cannot be art. However, as the work still reminds the contemporary
viewer, this is not (only) a problem of art’s ontology but of its definition and use.
In Burgin’s Room, logically structured propositions shift the perceptual and
conceptual order of reading and viewing, and engage the institutional and conceptual
framework of art and its experience. This context is expressed in the work itself, rather
than being referred to, and realized via its formal presentation. Burgin was particularly




























work’s communication and contextual function can be studied in its different displays (at
Idea Structures in a room of its own; at The New Art alongside other textual works; on
the page surrounded by other texts). For Peter Osborne (2002), Burgin’s text-works
perform a reflective mediation of phenomenological concerns of a post-minimalist art
combined with the philosophico-linguistic and set-theoretical problematic of analytical
conceptualism. However, whether one perceives the gallery room as part of the work or
conceives it as an application, this “otherwise” empty space is also discursively
constructed. The work refers to itself, the act of referring to itself, and the conditions
of viewing, being, and referring, and demands the presence of the spectator as a
requirement for communication. Equally, there is no totality of experience that the work
can offer, since it addresses the conditions of viewing/reading as these are perceptually,
conceptually, and institutionally defined. Thus, the process of reflection that Burgin’s
propositions incite is not teleological. Rather than displaying a progressive discovery of
appearances, the work reveals a dialectical relation between the physical and discursive
environments, wherein both the viewing subject and the viewed object are being
formulated.
Using language within a visual art context can be understood as trans-systemic
transposition between different notational systems and modes of communication, as well
as across their different conceptual and evaluative frameworks, which in turn can draw
attention to the meaning of a word, to the meaning of inscribing words, of making
pictures, of reading and viewing, of experiencing and reflecting. The negotiation of the
bigger picture by a particular artwork is dialectically interrelated to the viewer’s
understanding not only of that bigger picture but also of the object within that frame in
a constant process of transformative recognition and effect. The system of reference
determines its constituent parts and constituent parts are thus understood as to fit a given
system of reference. By manipulating language, conceptual art shows how, in practice,
the dialectics of experience and reflection of art is polarized by the distinction between
what finally goes on the gallery wall and what not. This distinction, by being instrumental
to the relation between outside and inside the frame of reference, establishes that frame.
By the same token, the distinction between the processes of interpretation and evaluation
can only be tentative, because what is worth analyzing is based on what has already been
understood and therefore deemed worthy of bearing relevant meaning. This means that
the esthetic qualifiers of an artwork are also part of its mode of signification and therefore
cannot confer exclusive value judgment, not so because judgment comes after experience,
but rather because judgment is part of the discursive system of meaning-making and
evaluation that defines the relation between the “I” and the object, its experience and
communication.
If minimalism sought to purge its materials and to indicate not only what one sees but
what can be seen in front of the viewer, conceptual art counter-suggested that the viewer
is unable to look in front of her less she is not looking in front of her. Thus, in order to
understand the function and critical potential of art in the social space of production, one
has to look and see how the artwork generates a chain of signification that implicates its
claims and how it negotiates its own status without rendering itself incommunicable or
readily available – that is, how well the artwork sustains this aporia of meaning. Rather
than internalizing the nature of art and celebrating the idea of art, art as idea, or the idea
as idea, critically engaged artworks contest both the methodological and ideological




























of externality as they stage their categorical transgression beyond given systems of art,
esthetic, or value. Demanding that analysis acknowledges the discursive fields of
meaning that are generated by the work in the process of manipulation and challenge
of art’s frame of reference is conceptual art’s legacy as a critical practice.
Notes
1. Bild, as the most basic form of representation, is often translated as picture or model. It is also
used to refer to the mental representation of a memory, and to what one makes when mapping
out an area. Wittgenstein uses different words to describe the relation of a picture to the world. A
picture represents (darstellen) the situation that would make it true, it depicts (abbilden) that
reality, and the elements in the proposition stand in for (vertreten) the objects in the represented
situation (White 2006, 50, 72).
2. Conversational analysis, based on Harvey Sacks’ Lecture Notes (1967–72, Department of
Sociology, University of California), concentrates on communication at the time of the event.
Discourse analysis extends beyond the sentence and considers the overall products of discourse
(see Sinclair and Coulthard 1975; Stubbs 1983; Brown and Yule 1984). Critical discourse
analysis considers the relations between power and discourse and the patterns of access to
(public) discourse for different social groups (van Dijk 1993; Fairclough 1995; Wodak and
Meyer 2001).
3. Alternatively, the “I” can be taken as a proper name, as in the example of “Sam,” in which case
the typology of the proposition reads: A(I). My thanks to Roger White for the indication.
However, in the case at hand, the subject of the utterance is not well established or is only
tentatively established. This is the starting point of the work’s critical engagement with its
context and its analysis.
4. The present article discusses the presentation of Room at Camden where referred propositions
are not repeated but located in different places inside the room. This is not the case for other
occasions of the work’s exhibition, and more recently Burgin’s retrospective at Fundació Tàpies
(2001, Barcelona). In Burgin’s words (2013), the selected layout preserves the central line of the
work, its ‘melody line’ as it were.
5. In a text titled “A Passing Fancy?,” and a letter to Barbara Reise dated November 1972, Arnatt
discussed the relations between what is said and the actions that support it such as public and
private goals and values, economic prejudices, social conventions, and – often – a passing fancy
(KA archives).
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